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THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY IN THE EXTRADITION OF
POLITICAL TERRORISTS
STEVEN LUBET* AND MORRIS CZACKES**
INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 1979, Ziyad Abu Eain was ar-
rested in Chicago and informed that the govern-
ment of Israel was seeking his extradition on the
charge of murder. The charges resulted from an
Israeli police investigation which linked him to a
bombing in a crowded market area in Tiberias,
Israel, which killed two children.1 Abu Eain as-
serted that he was not extraditable because of the
political offense exception that exists in the extra-
dition treaty between the United States and Israel.2
He claimed that Israel sought his extradition be-
cause of his past association with the Palestine
Liberation Organization and that in any event, the
bombing was a political act aimed at the State of
Israel. Following a lengthy hearing, a federal mag-
istrate in Chicago found that probable cause ex-
isted to extradite Abu Eain and that the charged
offenses did not fall under the political offense
exemption.
3
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; B. A.,
Northwestern University; J. D., University of California
at Berkeley.
** B. S., Columbia College; J. D. Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1978.
1 The bombing occurred on May 14, 1979. Tiberias is
a resort area on the Sea of Galilee. The area was unus-
ually crowded with young people who were participating
in a youth rally and holiday vacationers who had traveled
to the city for the feast of Lag B'Omer. The blast, which
was centered along one of the city's main thoroughfares,
killed two youngsters instantly. Thirty-two others re-
quired hospitalization and still others were treated for
minor injuries. N. Y. Times, May 15, 1979, at 5, col. 5.2 The Convention on Extradition between the United
States and Israel in relevant part provides:
Extradition shall not be granted in any of the
following circumstances:...
4. When the offense is regarded by the requested
Party as one of a political character or if the
person sought proves that the request for his
extradition has, in fact, been made with a view
to trying or punishing him for an offense of a
political character.
Dec. 10, 1962, art. VI, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476
(effective Dec. 5, 1963).
3
In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18,
1979) (mem.). There is no provision for direct appeal
from orders of a federal magistrate in extradition pro-
ceedings. The United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois denied a petition for a writ of
Six months earlier Peter GabrielJohn McMullen
successfully raised the same defense when Great
Britain sought his extradition from the United
States4 for involvement in the 1974 bombing of a
British Army Installation in England by the Pro-
visional Irish Republican Army.5 The federal mag-
istrate concluded that this bombing was part of a
political disturbance and was directed at the Brit-
ish army-a prime target for guerilla warfare.
6
These cases illustrate a highly intricate extradi-
tion jurisprudence. The political offense exemption
is found in virtually every modern treaty of extra-
dition and its application calls for findings of fact
and conclusions of law concerning crimes, events,
and political situations halfway around the world.
In Abu Eain, for example, the magistrate declined
to take judicial notice "that there is now, and has
existed for more than three decades, a military and
political conflict between the government of Israel
and the several Arab states and the people of
Palestine."7 In McMullen, however, the magistrate
did take notice that "an insurrection and a disrup-
tive uprising of a political nature" existed in North-
ern Ireland in 1974.8
habeas corpus on March 28, 1980. No. 79 C 5477 (N.D.
I1. March 28, 1980) (mem.). Abu Eain has appealed this
denial to the Seventh Circuit. No. 80-1487.
'The Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Great Britain provides in part:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the
crime or offence in respect of which his surrender is
demanded is one of a political character, or if he
proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in
fact, been made with a view to try or punish him
for a crime or offence of a political character.
Dec. 22, 1931, art. VI, 47 Stat., pt. 2, 2122, T.S. No. 849
(effective Aug. 4, 1932).
5 Evidence presented in the proceeding established Mr.
McMullen's membership in the Provisional Irish Repub-
lican Army at the time of the bombing. The political
objective of the PIRA is nationalization of Northern
Ireland. In 1964, the PIRA's terrorist activities created
heightened tension in England and Northern Ireland.
The British government responded by outlawing the Irish
Republican Army and conferring upon police unprece-
dented power to fight terrorist activities. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 30, 1974, at 4, col. 3.6 In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG, mem. at 5 (N.D.
Cal. May 11, 1979).
'In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175, mem. at 12-13.8 In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG, mem. at 4.
LUBET AND CZACKES
In an area that concerns American foreign policy
as deeply as does extradition, it is imperative that
the judiciary develop a uniform approach to the
application of the political offense exemption. Al-
though there is a significant body of American case
law that seeks to substantively define the term
"political offence" the courts have paid consider-
ably less attention to the procedural requisites of
the defense. This article explores the American
judiciary's procedural and substantive role in ex-
tradition proceedings as a framework for develop-
ing an approach to the political offense exemption
within the fundamental principles of individual
liberty and human rights.
EXTRADITION OF POLITICAL OFFENDERS
Extradition originally served as a device for sur-
rendering political dissidents and as a means by
which medieval rulers attempted to secure their
political structure.? Often political offenders were
extradited in the absence of any treaty. 0 As various
forms of constitutional government supplanted
monarchies, however, political dissent increasingly
gained acceptability and the use of extradition as
a political tool diminished in importance.' The
political offense exception first emerged in the
extradition treaty between Belgium and France in
1834.12 Philosophical concepts generated by the
French revolution' 3 encouraged political partici-
pation and political change and legitimized resist-
ance to tyrannical rule. Granting asylum to politi-
cal offenders was therefore conceived as a duty in
almost all cases.'
4
9 Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in International
Extradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britian
and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 777 (1977).
10 Deere, Political Offense in the Law and Practice of Extra-
dition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1933).
" Id. at 248.
12 See Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses
in the Law of Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. PiT. L. REv.
371, 372 (1953). One of the first countries to provide
specific domestic legislation exempting political offenders
from extraditon was Belgium in 1833. The first treaty
exempting the political offense from extradition appeared
in the treaty between France and Belgium in 1834. I. A.
SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1971)
13 Another reason provided by the authors of the 1933
Harvard Draft Convention on Extradition included the
growing sense of interdependence between nations
brought on by the Industrial Revolution and the appear-
ance of a variety of modes of transportation which made
escape from one country to another relatively easy. 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 108 (1953); see also Note, Bringing the
Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 71, 71-78 (1978).
I4 Deere, supra note 10, at 249.
The heightened concern for individual liberty,
political dissent, and human rights in the world
has led recently to various international enact-
ments.15 International concern perhaps peaked
with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948.
The framers of the Declaration sought to promote
uninhibited political debate by providing that for-
eign nations grant asylum to those accused of
political acts.'
6
The political offense exception is not limited to
nonviolent dissent; revolutionary or counterrevo-
lutionary violence may also be protected from ex-
tradition. While this view might, from time to time,
lead to distasteful results, it is clear that revolution
falls within the ambit of political activity.
Certain acts of violence, however, existing at the
fringe of legitimate revolution, challenge the con-
scionability of protecting such activities from ex-
tradition and punishment. It is the objective of the
political offense exception to protect those violent
u
5See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statu-
tory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18)
40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267;
International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural,
Civil, and Political Rights; G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1966);
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966); Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept.
28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (registered June 6, 1960);
Convention on Political Rights of Women, March 31,
1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (registered July 7, 1954); Protocol
Amending the Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva on
25 September 1926, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51;
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (registered April 22, 1954); Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (registered
Jan. 12, 1951).
16 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.
GAOR, 217A, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) provides: "1.
Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution. 2. This right may not
be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations." It should
be noted that while voting members of the General
Assembly unanimously approved the Declaration, eight
states abstained: Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R, Union
of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union did
sign A Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism
in 1937 at Geneva. This resolution was never passed.
Apparently Soviet policy, at least prior to the Afghani-
stan invasion, rejects international terrorism as a political
offense. See Gold, Non-extradition for Political Offenses: The
Communist Perspective, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,202 (1970).
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acts which are necessary and corollary to political
activity, not to sanction gratuitous assaults on hu-
man life. Acts of international terrorism directed
at civilians,17 whether undertaken by governments,
quasi-governments, or liberation movements, pose
serious threats to world order and stability. Consid-
ering the vulnerability of the world community to
destructive use of scientific and technological ad-
vancement, the ultimate impact of terrorist activity
is yet unknown. Nevertheless, terrorists, armed with
incendiary, chemical, biological, or even nuclear
weapons presently might be capable of maiming
or killing hundreds or thousands in a single attack
without regard to the status or identity of their
victims.'8 Such activities threaten basic human
rights as surely as does government repression of
dissent.'9 Furthermore, actions aimed at disrupting
various vital services might result in more anarchy
than change of government. 2°
Commentators have thus challenged on both a
philosophic and practical level the view that inter-
national terrorist activities, whether undertaken by
governments or individuals, fall within the same
purview of traditional human rights as either dis-
sent or revolution.2 ' One author in the field has
offered the following distinction:
Although rebellion cannot be separated from con-
17Terrorism may be defined in a number of ways
depending upon the extent and nature of the activities
undertaken. See Lowry, Terrorism and Human Rights:
Counter-Insurgewy and Necessity at Common Law, 53 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 49, 66 (1977); Tran-Tam, Crimes of Terrorism
and International Criminal Law, in A TREATISE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 490 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1973). For
purposes of this article, however, the essential elements
of international terrorism are: (1) the involvement of
citizenry of two or more countries or of acts occurring in
one country committed by nationals of another country;
(2) the involvement of a violent criminal act; and (3) the
aim of creating overwhelming fear for politically coercive
purposes within a country. R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM:
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 3-4
(1979).
IS See Jenkins & Rubin, New Vulnerabilities and the Ac-
quisition of New Weapons by Non-government Groups in EVANS
& MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
221 (1978).
19 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/181 1, while seeking to guarantee political dissent,
also seeks to guarantee a social and international order
which provides that everyone shall have the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person. See also Paust, Nonpro-
teced Persons or Things in EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 18,
at 354.
2See Jenkins & Rubin, supra note 18. The authors
discuss the impact of terrorist activities on such modem
systems as water, transportation, energy, communication,
and computerized management and information systems.
21 See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
flict, violence directed against innocent parties is
destructive not only of law and legal systems, but of
civilized society. It is true that revolution and re-
bellion are recognized remedies in customary inter-
national law. The difference between legality and
illegality, however is that violence directed against
governments and governmental officials is not an
international crime (except for an attack upon a
head of state) whereas terror, violence directed
against internationally protected personnel and
noncombatant third parties, is a criminal act. Ter-
rorist activity on the international level is basically
a political maneuver designed to disrupt personal
freedom and impair fundamental human rights. In
this sense, international terrorism represents abom-
inable means utilized for contemptible ends."2
Expressing similar concerns in its administration
of the ninety-three extradition treaties now in
force,23 the United States has strictly construed
POLITICAL CRIMES (1973) [hereinafter cited as TERROR-
IsM]; M. BAssioum, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974) [hereinafter cited as ExTRA-
DonON]; A. CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH
(1963); EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 18; R. FRIEDLANDER,
supra note 17.
2R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 17, at 44.
2See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (Supp. 11 1978) (Appendix C).
The United States has entered into bilateral extradition



































these laws when terrorist activities are involved.
Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for exam-
ple, has stated on the floor of the Senate that the
United States seeks to apprehend, bring to trial,
and penalize international terrorists.
24
The policy of providing asylum for dissidents
without becoming a haven for terrorists is easier to






























I think the president and the administration has
made it very clear that we do not condone or accept
terrorism in any way, that we oppose all of its
aspects, and we will do everything we can to see
that those who are involved in it are apprehended
and are brought to trial and penalized for their
action.
An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2236
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 30 (Jan. 23, 1978) (statement of Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance).
25 In the trial of Ziyad Abu Eain, Louis Fields, a
member of the Office of the Legal Advisor of the De-
partment of State testified that "[i]t is the view of the
Department of State that indiscriminate use of violence
against civilian populations, innocent, is a prohibited act,
and as such is a common crime of murder, punishable in
both states." In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175, mem. at 17
(quoting record at 1041). The State Department also
submitted the following statement of policy, signed by
Mr. Knute E. Malmborg, the Assistant Legal Advisor
directly responsible for international extradition matters:
Murder and causing serious bodily harm are pa-
tently not political offenses but common crimes. I
understand that the accused asserts that the bomb-
ing (in Tiberias on May 14, 1979) was politically
motivated. Based upon my examination of the evi-
dence and the official definition of terrorism, I have
concluded that, whatever the motivation, planting
and exploding a bomb with intent and result of
killing and wounding civilians indiscriminately is
not an offense of a political character but an act of
terrorism, pure and simple. It is the view of the
Department of State that Article VI, paragraph 4,
of the treaty is not applicable to acts of terrorism.
Record at 945. Similarly, the view presented by the
United States to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee
tainly all invoking the political offense exemption,
claim the mantle of political justification. 'Courts
have found drawing a line of demarcation between
protected political activity and criminal terror to
be quite difficult.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
defined the term "political offense., 26 Conse-
quently, the lower courts are left to decide the issue
on a case by case basis. Although the courts have
paid considerable attention to the substantive law,
they have not developed a coherent procedural
approach to the political offense exemption.
THE EXTRADITION PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Extradition of a fugitive may be based upon
comity or reciprocity, or upon a treaty obligation.
2 7
In certain extreme cases, a country might use ab-
duction, kidnapping, or some informal procedure
to obtain jurisdiction over an individual.28 Al-
though the extent of the United States' obligations
to grant an extradition request absent a treaty was
on International Terrorism was that violence against
civilians falls beyond the scope of legitimate political
activity:
The subject of international terrorism has, as the
Secretary-General has already emphasized, nothing
to do with the question of when the use of force is
legitimate in international life. On that question,
the provisions of the Charter, general international
law, and the declarations and resolutions of the
United Nations organs, in particular those of the
General Assembly relating to national liberation
movements, are not and cannot be affected. But
even when the use of force is legally and morally
justified, there are some means, as in every form of
human conflict, which must not be used: the legit-
imacy of a cause does not in itself legitimize the use
of certain forms of violence, especially against the
innocent. This has long been recognized even in the
customary law of war.
U.N. Doc. A/C 6/418 (1979).
26 In Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), revg
per curiam, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), the most well
known recent Supreme Court opinion on political extra-
dition, the Court simply remanded the case to the district
court without commenting on the definition of a political
offense.27 Extradition based solely upon comity or reciprocity
often has been resorted to by a number of foreign nations.
See generally Evans, Legal Bases of Extradition, 16 N.Y.L.F.
525, 530 (1930).
28The kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann is a prime ex-
ample of such irregular seizures. Attorney General of
Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (1962). In certain
instances, deportation of an individual may result in de
facto extradition. See O'Higgins, "Disguised Extradition":
The Soblen Case, 27 MOD. L. REV. 521 (1964); see also M.
BASSIOUNi, EXTRADITION, supra note 21, at 121-20 1.
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the subject of much debate in the nineteenth cen-
turys it is now generally well established that the
United States will honor an extradition request
only pursuant to its treaty obligations.3° Further-
more, Congress has required implementation of
certain safeguards before returning an individual
to the requesting country.
3
'
Extradition is a criminal proceeding32 which the
authorized representative of a requesting country
may initiatess by filing a verified complaint with
the nearest court having jurisdiction over the in-
dividual.m A judicial officer then may issue a war-
29see generally Evans, supra note 27.
3 0Valentine v. United States ex ret. Neidecker, 299 U.S.
5 (1936); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933);
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); see also
Evans, supra note 27, at 528 (citing I MOORE, A TREATIsE
ON EXTRADITION AND INTERsTATE RENDITION 23 (1891)),
where Professor Evans notes, the Arguiles case is the only
known case where the United States granted extradition
in the absence of a treaty. Arguilles was actively involved
in slave trading and was turned over to the Spanish
government by Executive Order in 1864 as an act of
comity.
3'18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976) provides:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for
extradition between the United States and any
foreign government, any justice or judge of the
United States, or any magistrate authorized so to
do by a court of the United States or any judge of
a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State,
may, upon complaint made under oath, charging
any person found within his jurisdiction, with hav-
ing committed within the jurisdiction of any such
foreign government any of the crimes provided for
by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for
the apprehension of the person so charged, that he
may be brought before such justice, judge, or mag-
istrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality
may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing,
he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or
convention, he shall certify the same, together with
a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the
Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon
the requisition of the proper authorities of such
foreign government, for the surrender of such per-
son, according to the stipulations of the treaty or
convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the
commitment of the person so charged to the proper
jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be
made.
s2Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902); Rice v. Ames,
180 U.S. 371 (1901); First National City Bank of New
York v. Aristequieta, 287 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated
as moot, 375 U.S. 49 (1963).
33Although the representative often will be a consul or
diplomatic officer, it is only necessary that the person
filing the complaint have authorization from the request-
ing country. See United States ex reL Caputo v. Kelly, 92
F.2d 605, cert. denied, 303 U.S. 635 (1938).
34A careful reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 reveals that
rant for the individual's arrest and further deten-
tion if the complaint satisfies all requirements."
Once the individual is in custody, the presiding
judicial officer may set or deny bail.36
The requesting nation may supplement this pro-
cedure by filing a requisition with the Secretary of
State asking that the accused be returned in ac-
cordance with the terms of the existing treaty. The
requesting nation may file the requisition either
prior to or during the judicial proceedings. If filed
prior to the judicial proceedings, the Secretary of
State may issue a preliminary mandate to the
proper judicial officer on behalf of the foreign
government. The mandate usually includes a copy
of the verified complaint as well as other support-
ing documentation. The judicial officer then issues
a warrant as if the foreign country had itself filed
the complaint.37
jurisdiction over the extradition proceedings is vested in
judicial persons and not in any court. The theory under-
lying-this delegation of power assumes that extradition is
not a judicial function, but rather one reposed in the
Department of State. Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d
626 (7th Cir. 1932). However, it is generally agreed that
in the first instance, extradition is a matter of judicial
competence. See Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 290 F.2d 106,
108 (1961) where Judge Brown, in his concurrence,
stated:
Repeated often in the cases is the loose generality
that the extradition hearing is not a judicial pro-
ceeding. It may not be when measured by the usual
indicia of a formal judgment of commitment, ap-
peal, and the like. But the very essence of 18
U.S.C.A. § 3184 is a reflection of the fundamental
concept among civilized nations that there shall be
a non-partisan, unbiased, objective hearing by a
judicial officer acting solely because of his judicial
position-and hence training and discipline-to de-
termine whether there is a sufficient basis to sustain
the charge under the treaty.
'The authorized representative may file the com-
plaint upon an information or belief that is properly
sworn and attested. Ordinarily the complaint should
include the name of the individual sought; the nature of
the extradition treaty between the United States and the
requesting country; sufficient information to show that
the crime charged is an offense under the treaty and
under both the laws of the area where the complaint is
filed and the laws of the requesting country; a certified
copy of the indictments or conviction of the individual
sought by the requesting country by competent authori-
ties showing the offense charged; accompanying affida-
vits, documents and other pertinent evidence proving the
foreign law and the facts alleged. M. BASSIOUNI, EXTRA-
DITION, supra note 23, at 514; see also Note, United States
Extradition Procedures, 16 N.Y.L.F. 420 (1970).
36In re Gannon, 27 F.2d 362 (E.D. Pa. 1928). Bail need
not be set because procedures for release on bail are
purely statutory and are not provided for in 18 U.S.C. §
3184.37 See note 33 supra.
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The role of the court of extradition is ultimately
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence in
support of the request.8 The requesting country
bears the burden of establishing probable cause to
believe that the accused committed the charged
offense.3 9 To reach the issue of probable cause, the
court must make three additional findings. First,
the extradition treaty must be in effect and appli-
cable to the case.40 Second, the person named in
the complaint must be the same individual who is
before the magistrate or extraditing judge.4 ' Fi-
nally, the "rule of dual criminality" requires that
the acts charged constitute a criminal offense in
both the requesting country and the forum state.4 2
This decision-making process, which has been rec-
ognized either implicitly or explicitly by most
courts of extradition, 43 does not specifically con-
template a political offense defense. The defense,
however, is clearly invocable as either a challenge
to the applicability of the treaty or to the crimi-
nality of the acts charged. In either case, it remains
unresolved which party bears the burden of pro-
ducing evidence on this issue and which bears the
ultimate burden of proof.
The Supreme Court has analogized the extradi-
tion hearing to a preliminary hearing in a criminal
case.44 Because the hearing is not a plenary pro-
ceeding involving the actual guilt or innocence of
the accused,4 ' the judicial officer may afford the
requesting country wide latitude in producing ev-
idence to establish the commission of the offense
and probable cause. The evidence may consist of
hearsay in the form of affidavits, depositions, or
other pertinent documentation. The requesting
country need not produce witnesses.46
s8Peroffv. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); see also Benson v.
MacMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 460 (1888).
39Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911);
Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d at 1249; United States v.
Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383, 388 (1959).40See Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954). See also Note, supra note
37, at 441.4 1lIvancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565.42 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).43See M. BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 21, at 515-
24, and cases cited therein.
"'Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Benson v.
McMahon, 127 U.S. 457.45Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970).
4618 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976) provides:
Depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies
thereof offered in evidence upon the hearing of any
extradition case shall be received and admitted as
evidence on such hearing for all the purposes of
such hearing if they shall be properly and legally
Evidence admissible on behalf of the accused is
restricted, again on the theory that the proceeding
is preliminary. 7 The extraditee has a limited right
to present, and even subpoena,4 8 witnesses material
to his defense. However, the court only will permit
the defendant to introduce evidence which is of-
fered either to show that he is not the actual person
being sought by the requesting country,49 or to
explain the circumstances of the offense.- ° The
defendant may not present any other evidence in
defense of the charge, such as an alibi, because it
would have no bearing on whether the requesting
country has established a prima facie case. 5' The
authenticated so as to entitle them to be received
for similar purposes by the tribunal of the foreign
country from which the accused party shall have
escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplo-
matic or consular officer of the United States resi-
dent in such foreign country shall be proof that the
same, so offered, are authenticated in the manner
required.47Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. at 461-62.
818 U.S.C. § 3191 (1976) provides:
On the hearing of any case under a claim of extra-
dition by a foreign government, upon affidavit
being filed by the person charged setting forth that
there are witnesses whose evidence is material to his
defense, that he cannot safely go to trial without
them, what he expects to prove by each of them,
and that he is not possessed of sufficient means, and
is actually unable to pay the fees of such witnesses,
the judge or magistrate hearing the matter may
order that such witnesses be subpoenaed; and the
costs incurred by the process, and the fees of wit-
nesses, shall be paid in the same manner as in the
case of witnesses subpoenaed in behalf of the United
States.
496 M. WHITEMAN, DasST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
998-99 (1968).
'
0 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1922); Charl-
ton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. at 462. Cf Sindona v. Grant, 461
F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Application of
D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 929-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
r
5 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. at 315-16; Shapiro v.
Ferrardino, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. dis-
missed, 414 U.S. 884 (1974). In Collins the Supreme Court
noted that to allow the accused to present exculpatory
evidence:
would give him the option of insisting upon a full
hearing and trial of his case here; and that might
compel the demanding government to produce all
its evidence here, both direct and rebutting, in order
to meet the defense thus gathered from every
quarter. The result would be that the foreign gov-
ernment, though entitled by the terms of the treaty
to the extradition of the accused for the purpose of
a trial where the crime was committed, would be
compelled to go into a full trial on the merits in a
foreign country, under all the disadvantages of such
a situation, and could not obtain extradition until
after it had procured a conviction of the accused
upon a full and substantial trial here. This would
be in plain contravention of the intent and meaning
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accused, however, may offer evidence of the polit-
ical nature of the crime, to show that the offense is
not extraditable under the treaty. Evidence of the
crime's political nature is admissible exclusively to
explain the circumstances of the crime. It is not
admissible, for example, in aid of a defense of
justification or necessity.52 The decision as to the
admissibility of evidence lies within the sound dis-
cretion of the extraditing judge, and it is not
reversible unless it negates the purposes of the
hearing.5
Review of the magistrate's decision within the
judicial system is limited. Although upon an ad-
verse ruling, the requesting country may refile its
request,'" the particular ruling terminates the pro-
ceeding and is not thereafter subject to direct ap-
peal to a higher court. This restriction reflects the
theory that, because ajudicial officer administering
the hearing does not sit as a member of any court,
his decision is not a final order open for direct
appeal. However, the accused may collaterally at-
tack the decision by filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.55 The only issues generally review-
able in these proceedings are those relating to
jurisdiction, the existence, application, or interpre-
tation of the treaty, and the identity of the individ-
ual appearing at the hearing.56
If the courts ultimately authorize extradition,
the Department of State must independently de-
cide whether to deliver the accused to the request-
ing government.5 7 The Secretary of State will not
of the extradition treaties.
259 U.S. at 316 (quoting In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866
(S.D.N.Y.), aff/d, 16 F. 332 (1883)).
026 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 49, at 999-1001. Evi-
dence concerning the motives of the requesting govern-
ment or% the procedures which await the accused upon
his return to the requesting country are irrelevant to the
judicial officer's determination and hence inadmissible.
Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d at 1249; Garcia-Guillern v.
United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1965); Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. at
204.
53See Collins v. Loisell, 259 U.S. 309; Merino v. United
States Marshall, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 997 (1963).
54See 2 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 367-70 (1973).
"528 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
56Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925); Garcia-
Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189.
5718 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976) provides:
The Secretary of State may order the person com-
mitted under sections 3184 or 3185 of this title to be
delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign
government, to be tried for the offense of which
charged.
consider the request until the completion of all
judicial proceedings. 8 Further action by the Sec-
retary will be foreclosed if the court holds that an
extraditable offense did not occur within the mean-
ing of the treaty. If the courts find the accused
extraditable, the secretary has broad discretion to
deny extradition if conditions so warrant. Gener-
ally, the Department of State conducts a de novo
examination of the issues and court proceedings
and bases its decision on the available record.59
The Secretary, however, may consider matters out-
side the record such as competing requests from
different countries, a time lapse barring prosecu-
tion, or public policy in light of current interna-
tional relations.' Thus, the courts often defer con-
sideration of whether an individual is being sought
for political reasons to the Department of State.
61
In addition to reviewing matters beyond the
record, the Secretary may differ from the commit-
ting magistrate on the weight or sufficiency of the
evidence.62 Such a disparate reading of the record
occurred when the Russian government requested
the extradition of Krishian Rudewitz in 1908 on
charges of murder and arson. A committing mag-
istrate held that the offenses were not political and
thus certified extradition. After his own careful
review of the record, however, the Secretary of
State denied the request because he determined
that the charges were the result of activities under-
taken by the accused as a member of the Social
Democratic Labor Party.63
Despite this broad discretion, the Secretary has
in fact seldom overruled a court decision in favor
of extradition.6' This apparent deference to the
Such agent may hold such person in custody, and
take him to the territory of such foreign government,
pursuant to such treaty.
A person so accused who escapes may be retaken
in the same manner as any person accused of any
offense.
584 G. HACKWORTH, DIoESr OF INTERNATIONAL LAw §
334 (1944) (citing a memorandum from counselor An-
derson of the Department of State to Secretary of State
Knox, February 1912, Department of State File
211.42R67116).
59 See Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM.
L. REv. 1313 (1962); see also 4 G. HAcKWORTH, supra note
58, at § 334.
6
"See 4 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 58, at § 334.61Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189; In
re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), affidper curiam, 241
U.S. 651 (1916); In re Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
62See 4 G. HAcKwoRTH, supra note 58, at § 334.
631d.
6 See generally Note, supra note 59.
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courts reflects a political sensitivity to international
estime. Judicial determination of extradition issues
permits the Executive Branch to remove itself from
political and economic sanctions which might re-
sult if other nations believe the United States lax
in the enforcement of its treaty obligations.
Thus, the role of the judicial officer in the extra-
dition process, although theoretically preliminary
to that of the State Department, might well be
determinative of the entire proceeding and might
effectively preempt the Executive Branch in the
conduct of American foreign policy. From a prac-
tical perspective, the danger of vesting this deci-
sion-making in the judiciary is that a judicial offi-
cer hearing the case might lack the expertise to
determine the p 6 litical or nonpolitical nature of an
offense arising in an intricate international fact
situation. This danger is especially acute with re-
spect to cases involving terrorists because of the
complex and ambiguous interplay between their
avowed goals and actual conduct.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAw
The question of what constitutes a political of-
fense has been the subject of international scholarly
debate, diplomatic discussion, and judicial opin-
ion.'s Certain international agreements to which
the United States is a party prohibit the signatories
from treating slavery,6 genocide,6 7 and aircraft
hijacking as political offenses.69 Several European
bilateral extradition treaties provide that acts
65 See generally 4 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 58, at §§
313-17; 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1019-
26 (2d ed. 1945); 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 49, at 799-
858; See also sources cited in note 21 supra. Forsythe,
Political Prisoners: The Law and Politics of Protection, 9 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 295 (1976); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of
Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48
VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962).
6 See Slavery Convention of 25 September 1926, as
amended, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (registered July 7, 1955);
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (registered April 30, 1957).
n See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(regstered Jan. 12, 1951).
See Convention on Aviation: Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,
20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6788, 704 U.N.T.S. 219
(Effective Dec. 4, 1969); Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct.
14, 1971).
69 Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle
of Nonextradition of Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927
(1964).
against heads of state and diplomatic personnel are
nonpolitical.70 Several more recent treaties pro 'ide
that offenses aimed at transportation or commu-
nication networks are extraditable.7' Others have
gone even further and include offenses against
domestic laws relating to firearms, explosives, or
incendiary devices. 72 Finally, certain treaties pro-
vide that any drug offense is extraditable.
73
Political offenses historically have been defined
as either relative or purely political. Relative polit-
ical offenses are otherwise common crimes com-
mitted in connection with a political act, such as a
homicide committed in the course of a general
uprising.74 If the nexus between the crime and the
political act is sufficiently close, the offense is "rel-
atively political" and not extraditable; if the con-
nection is remote or non-existent the accused may
be extradited. 75 Purely political offenses are acts
aimed directly at the government and are defini-
tionally limited to treason, sedition, and espionage.
It is generally agreed that the purely political
offenses are not extraditable.
76
Purely political offenses are easily recognizable,
whereas relative political offenses often are difficult
to distinguish from common crimes unconnected
with a political act. Accordingly, the case law in
the political offenses area has concentrated on the
definition and interpretation of relative political
offenses. In order to gain a full and critical under-
70 M. BASS1OUNi, EXTRADITION, supra note 21, at 410.
7' Article II of the Extradition Treaty between the
United States and New Zealand provides that the follow-
ing shall be deemed to be extraditable offenses: "26.
[a]rson and damage to property, utilities, or means of
transportation or communication by fire or explosive;
[and] 27. [a]ny malicious act done with intent to cause
danger to property or endanger the safety of any person
in connection with any means of transportation." Jan.
12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1, 2-3, T.I.A.S. No. 7035 (effective
Dec. 8, 1970).
72 See Extradition Treaty, United States-Italy, Jan. 18,
1973, 26 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S. No. 8052 (effective March
11, 1975).
73 Article II of the Convention on Extradition between
the United States and France provides that the following
shall be deemed to be extraditable offenses: "16. Offenses
against the laws relating to the traffic in, possession, or
production or manufacture of, opium, heroin, and other
narcotic drugs, cannabis, hallucinogenic drugs, cocaine,
and its derivatives, and other dangerous drugs and chem-
icals; or poisonous chemicals or substances injurious to
health." Feb. 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 407, 409, T.I.A.S. No.
7075 (effective April 3, 1971).
74 Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1239.
75 See, e.g., In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (1894).76 See 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 49, at 800; Garcia-
Mora, supra note 65.
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standing of the American approach to relative
political offenses it is instructive first to examine
British precedent on which the American courts
initially relied.
THE BRITISH APPROACH
British extradition law has been governed by
statute since the passage of the Extradition Act of
1870.77 This act specifically provides exceptions for
offenses of a political character and offenses for
which the offender has been sought with the intent
to punish him for a political action. 78 The term
"political character," however, is not defined either
in the Extradition Act or elsewhere in British stat-
utes. The court in In re Castolini79 made the first
judicial attempt to supply content to the phrase.
Castolini created the basic substantive test which
has dominated Anglo-American law in this area
since 1891.
Angelo Castolini was arrested in England after
Switzerland sought his extradition for the murder
of Luigi Rossi, a Swiss government official. The
people of the Swiss town of Bellizona had peti-
tioned the government for revision of the Consti-
tution of the province. The government, appar-
ently fearing a loss of power, refused to hold a
popular vote on the issue as required by law. The
townspeople then raided the town's arsenal and
marched to the municipal palace. After being de-
nied entry to the building by Rossi and another
government official, the group stormed the build-
ing. Castolini, who was one of the first to enter,
shot Rossi as he appeared in the palace's passage-
way. The record is silent as to whether Rossi offered
any armed resistance, but testimony by a leader of
the uprising indicates that he did not.8° Following
the takeover of the palace a provisional government
controlled the province until the government of the
Republic restored order.
Justice Denman concluded that the events in
Bellizona at the time of the killing amounted to a
77 Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52.
78 The Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52,
reads in pertinent part:
(1) A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if
the offense to which is surrendered or demanded is
one of a political character or if he proves to the
satisfaction of the police magistrate or the court
before whom he is brought on habeas corpus, or to
the Secretary of State that the requisition for his
surrender has in fact been made with a view to try
to punish him for an offense of a political character.
[1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
80 Id. at 151.
state of war within the province and that Castolini
was an active participant at a very early stage of
the uprising.8 ' In finding Castolini not extradita-
ble, Justice Denman formulated the now classic
test for application of the political offense excep-
tion: first, there must be a political disturbance at
the time of the offense; and second, the offense
must constitute an overt act incidental to or part
of the political disturbance.
8 2
A terrorist attack by an avowed anarchist pro-
vided the British courts with opportunity to further
define the Castolini political disturbance test two
years later in In re Meunier.83 Meunier had set off
various explosive devices at the Cafe Very in Paris
and in military barracks outside the city. The
explosions killed several individuals, and Meunier
sought refuge in England. The French government
requested his extradition for murder, attempted
murder, and willful damage to buildings. A British
divisional court rejected Meunier's habeas corpus
petition and held the political offense exception
inapplicable to anarchist-inspired offenses.
This holding reflected hostility to the anarchist
movement which characterized the period. Non-
aligned terrorist-type activities aimed at promoting
disorder and disharmony were viewed not as polit-
ically related but as a common evil unworthy of
protection. Justice Case spoke for the Court:
[I]n order to constitute an offense of a political
character, there must be two or more parties in the
state, each seeking to impose the Government of
their own choice on the other, and if the offense is
committed by one side or the other in pursuance of
the object, it is a political offense, otherwise not. In
the present case there are not two parties in the
State, each seeking to impose the Government of
their own choice on the other for the party with
whom the accused is identified by the evidence, and
by his own voluntary statement, namely the party
of anarchy, is the enemy of all Governments. Their
efforts are directed primarily against the separate
body of citizens.8
The Court's rationale appears to address both
the intent of the offender and the impact of his act.
8'Id at 152.
2 Id. at 159. According to Justice Denman:
The question really is, whether, upon the facts, it is
clear that the man was acting as one of a number
of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political
character with a political object, and as part of the
political movement and rising in which he was
taking part.
mId. [1894] 2 QB. 415.
84 Id. at 419.
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An offense which is intended only to disrupt the
social order, but not to maintain or alter the gov-
ernment, is not political. Likewise, an offense hav-
ing its impact upon the citizenry, but not directly
upon the government, does not fall within the
political offense exception.
The English courts first considered the motives
of a requesting government in 1895. In In re Arlon
the French government sought a fugitive on
charges of embezzlement and fraud.85 The accused
claimed that the French government actually
sought to regain jurisdiction over him in order to
interrogate him about a political matter. He there-
fore argued that he was not extradictable because
"the requisition for his surrender ha[d] in fact been
made with a view to punish him for an offense of
a political character."as Rejecting this argument,
Lord Russell held that the provision under which
Arton claimed protection was analogous to the
doctrine of speciality,87 and that it was therefore
outside the province of the courts to determine the
good faith of the requesting country.88 He further
held that an offense of a political character must
be readily defineable and not subject to future
definition.8
9
These three cases provided a relatively narrow
framework for the application of the political of-
fense exception until the middle of this century: a
political offense was defined as incidental to or
part of a political disturbance, excluding crimes
aimed at the civilian population or undertaken
only to create social disorder: The good faith of the
requesting country was not questioned. In 1955,
however, the case of Regina v. Governor of Brixton
Prison, ex pare Kolczynskzo extended the political
offense exception.
In Kolczynski the British court first allowed the
defense to be raised in the absence of a political
disturbance in the requesting country. 9' The case
involved seven crew members of a Polish fishing
trawler who sought political asylum in England
after taking control of their boat from a communist
crew in international waters. The Polish govern-
ment requested extradition of the sailors for the
[1896] 1 Q.B. 108; [1896] 1 Q.B. 509.
"6 [1896] 1 QB. 108.
87 The doctrine of specialty allows the requesting coun-
try to try the accused only for the offense for which
extradition was sought. See note 128 infra.
88 [1896] 1 Q.B. at 115.
89 Id. at 114. See also concurring opinion of Wills, J. Id.
at 115-16.
9 [19541 1 Q.B. 540; See discussion in I.A. SHEARER,
supra note 12, at 175-78.
9' [19541 1 Q.B. 540.
common crimes of use of force, depriving superiors
and other members of the crew of their freedom,
wounding a member of the crew, damaging the
trawler's wireless, and preventing the ship's captain
from maintaining command, thus exposing the
crew to the danger of calamity at sea and loss of
life.a2 The Court permitted the fishermen to intro-
duce various documents showing that any trial in
Poland ostensibly for the extradited offenses would
in fact result in punishment for the treasonous act
of defecting to a capitalist country.9 3 This evidence
led the Court to deny extradition under the polit-
ical offense exception. Justice Cassels concluded
that extradition was being sought with a view
toward punishing the defendants for political acts
and that therefore the motives of the requesting
country precluded surrender of the fugitives under
the second part of the Extradition Act.'6 Justice
Goddard, on the other hand, reached the same
result without emphasizing the motives of the Pol-
ish government. Rather, he suggested that a hu-
manitarian perspective of changing world condi-
tions required a more liberal interpretation of Cas-
tolini even where the offenses did not form part of
a general uprising. He reasoned that the evidence
admitted on the prisoners' behalf showed that their
crimes were political in that they were aimed at
the Polish government which suppressed any
meaningful dialogue within its border.
9 5
Although the justices differed in their reasoning,
the ultimate result in Kolczynski was to apply the
political offense exception to an act unconnected
to a general disturbance solely because of the mo-
tives of the parties involved. The Court's divided
opinion did not make clear whether future deci-
sions would rest on the motives of the requesting
country or on those of the defendant, but it was
apparent that the Court was willing to consider the
nature of the requesting government in applying
the political offense exception. The Kolczynski case
marked the British courts' farthest extension of the
political offense exception, and many scholars be-
lieved that it offered hope to those who must
commit crimes to escape persecution in their home-
land.96
92 1 d. at 543.
9 3 See [1955] 3 All E.R. 33.
4 [1955] 1 Q.B. at 548.
95 Id. at 549-50 (Goddard, CJ.). It is at least arguable
that such decisions involving humanitarian considera-
tions are better left to the executive branch of government
as in American extradition proceedings.
96 Cantrell, supra note 9; see Garcia-Mora, supra note
65, at 1244.
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The Kolczynski decision was later refined in
Schtraks v. Israel.9 7 In Schtraks the defendant, Shalom
Schtraks, had attempted to have his nephew edu-
cated as an Orthodox Jew against the wishes of the
boy's parents. After hiding the youth in a settle-
ment in Israel he fled to England. Israel sought
Schtraks' extradition on the charge of child stealing
and perjury. During the extradition proceeding,
Schtraks attempted to show the close interrelation-
ship of politics and religion within Israel. He also
attempted to demonstrate that the question of
religious orthodoxy was a highly charged political
issue in Israel. The Court, however, refused to find
that the act was political. Although Schtraks' ac-
tions were intended to avoid what he perceived as
political persecution, the Court concluded that
they were based ultimately on personal motivations
and that the political nature of the act was only a
tangential factor.
98
The Court thus declined to adopt a "pure mo-
tive" approach. Like the justices in Kolczynski,
Viscount Radcliffe pointed out that the test in
Castolini was still valid, but not conclusive in deter-
mining whether an offense was political.9 Offering
a refinement of the Kolczynski holding, the Viscount
Radcliffe stated that it was necessary to evaluate
the objective conditions surrounding the accused's
actions and to determine whether the requesting
nation seeks his extradition primarily for "crimi-
nal" or for "political" reasons. I°° If the posture of
the requesting government is politically neutral,
then the accused may be extradited regardless of
motive:
There may, for instance, be all sorts of contending
political organizations or forces in a country, and
members of them may commit sorts of infractions
of the criminal law in the belief that by so doing
they will further political ends: but if the central
government stands apart and is concerned only to
97 [1962] 3 All E.R. 529.
98 Id. at 540.
99 Id., where the Justice states:
In my opinion the idea that lies behind the phrase
"offence of a political character" is that the fugitive
is at odds with the state that applies for his extra-
dition on some issue connected with the political
control or government of the country. The analogy
of "political" in this context is with "political" in
such phrases as "political refugee," "political asy-
lum" or "political prisoner." It does indicate, I
think, that the requesting state is after him for
reasons other than the enforcement of the criminal
law in its ordinary, what I may call its common or
international aspect.
10o Id.
enforce the criminal law that has been violated by
these contestants, I see no reason why fugitives
should be protected by this country from its juris-
diction on the ground that they are political offend-
ers.
01
Reconciling Castolini and Schiraks appears to re-
quire the continued application of the nexus test
to offenses which form part of a disturbance or
uprising. When the exception is claimed for iso-
lated acts, the British courts seem willing to ex-
amine the accused's motives as well as those of the
requesting country. Implicit in this approach is the
courts' constant reevaluation of the political offense
exception in light of the existing international en-
vironment.
THE AMERICAN APPROACH
The approach of the American judiciary to the
political crimes exception has not substantially de-
viated from the Castolini test, which required that
an overt act be committed in furtherance of a
political disturbance. The American courts, unlike
their British counterparts, have not been willing to
consider the motivations of either the defendant or
the requesting country. I°2 This narrow interpreta-
tion of the exception may be characterized as both
underinclusive and overinclusive, as it tends to
exempt from extradition all crimes occurring dur-
ing a political disturbance, but no offenses which
were not contemporaneous with an uprising.I 03 The
strict adherence to the requirement that the act be
tied to an uprising or disturbance may operate to
exclude from protection many individual acts of
101 Id.
102 See note 64 supra; see also Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d
1247; Garcia-Guillem v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189.
103 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic,
170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). CF. Schtraks, v. Israel
[1962] 3 All E.R. 529. With regard to the question of
contemporaneity, Viscount Radcliffe noted:
Generally speaking, the courts' reluctance to offer
a definition has been due, I think, to the realisation
that it is virtually impossible to find one that does
not cover too wide a range. This is seen in the very
full consideration that was given to the question in
Re Castioni particularly when counsel for the appli-
cant's argument in that case is set against the sub-
sequent observations of the threejudges who decided
it, Denman, Hawkins and Stephen, JJ. It was re-
called that during the debate of 1866 that preceded
the Extradition Act, John Stuart Mill, then a mem-
ber of the House of Commons, had suggested as a
definition,"any offence committed in the course of
or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political
commotion." Stephen, J., himself had offered the
view in his Histozy of the Criminal Law of England, Vol.
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legitimate political resistance. Conversely, the ov-
erinclusive aspect of the approach may operate to
protect common criminals simply because their
crimes occur during times of political disorder.
Theoretically, review of certifications of extradition
by the Secretary of State may justify and partially
remedy the problem of underinclusiveness,'0 4 how-
ever, the State Department's traditional policy of
noninterference has resulted in almost uniform
enforcement of judicial orders of extradition.'0 5 In
those cases where a strict construction of Castolini
results in a denial of extradition, the Secretary of
State is, of course, entirely precluded from
acting. 10
6
The narrow interpretation of Castolini was first
adopted by a United States court in an 1894 case,
In re Ezeta,'0 7 involving a request by San Salvador
to extradite its former President, Antonio Ezeta,
and four of his military officers from the United
States. The requisition charged these individuals
with the crimes of murder, robbery, and arson.
These charges allegedly arose from acts that Ezeta
and his aides undertook while attempting to main-
tain their government against the revolutionary
movement that eventually overthrew them.'0 ° The
trial court held that all but one of the alleged
events were political because they occurred during
a time of armed rebellion within the country. The
exception involved an individual charged with the
attempted murder of a civilian. The court held
Castolini inapplicable to this charge because the
crime took place four months prior to the start of
armed violence in San Salvador. In responding to
the defendant's contention that San Salvador's
request was politically motivated, the Court de-
2, p. 71, that political offences comprised only those
crimes that were "incidental to and formed a part of
political disturbances." The court was unanimous in
holding Mill's definition to be altogether too wide.
The offender must be at least politically motivated.
3 All E.R. at 539.
104 See note 64 supra, and accompanying text.
10 5 id.
'enIn re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG, serves as such
an example.
107 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
'08 The acts alleged in the extradition complaint in-
cluded: (1) robbery of a bank to pay soldiers involved in
fighting revolutionary forces; (2) the murder of a civilian
who was thought to be a spy; (3) the hanging of four
individuals who refused to defend the then existing gov-
ernment against the revolutionary forces; (4) the murder
of an individual who helped the revolutionary forces in
overthrowing the Ezeta government; 62 F. 972, 979-80
(N.D. Cal. 1894).
ferred the issue to resolution by the Secretary of
State. 9
Two years later the Supreme Court refined the
Ezeta court's application of the political offense
exception. In Ornelas v. Ruiz" ° the government of
Mexico sought the extradition of three individuals
who had crossed the Rio Grande with a group of
approximately 140 other armed men. The group
subsequently attacked forty Mexican soldiers in
the village of San Ignacio and terrorized the town
and its citizenry. The magistrate first hearing the
case concluded that the defendants' actions were
personally motivated and not intended to further
the political disturbances then occurring within
Mexico. The Supreme Court affirmed the magis-
trate's ruling as supported by the record, thus
interpreting Castolini as requiring that the defend-
ants' actions be not only contemporaneous with
some political disturbance, but also unqualifiedly
connected with the furtherance of the political
revolt.'
The history of the extradition proceedings
against Andrija Artukovic" 2 underscores the im-
portance of the distinction between "furtherance"
and contemporaneity. The Yugoslavian govern-
ment sought Artukovic, the former Minister of
Internal Affairs for the pro-German government of
Croatia during World War II, for allegedly order-
ing the execution of two hundred thousand inmates
of concentration camps in Yugoslavia during the
war. While awaiting an extradition hearing on the
matter, Artukovic filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the District Court for the
Northern District of California.1 5 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant
the writ prior to any evidentiary hearing.11 4 Both
courts determined that the offenses charged were
political because they occurred during the German
invasion of Yugoslavia and subsequent establish-
109 62 F. at 986 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
"o 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
.. Id. at 511.
12 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affid sub non.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957),
rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), decision on remand sub
non. United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). The Yugoslavian indictment
accused Artukovic of "having, in the course of 1941 and
1942, when Yugoslavia was occupied by German and
Italian troops, issued orders based on criminal motives,
hatred, and the desire for power to members of bands of
which he was one of the leaders, to carry out mass
slaughters of the peaceful civilian population of Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina." 247 F.2d at 204.
uS 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
.4 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
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ment of the short-lived independent government of
Croatia."5 Neither court considered the civilian
status of Artukovic's alleged victims or analyzed
whether the murder of two hundred thousand
persons was actually in furtherance of a political
end."
6
The United States Supreme Court, in a one
paragraph per curiam opinion, reversed the Ninth
Circuit and remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing. 1 7 The hearing was subsequently held be-
fore a federal magistrate and extradition again was
refused, this time on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to establish probable cause of
Artukovic's guilt.118 In dicta, however, the magis-
trate adopted the earlier Ninth Circuit opinion
which concluded that because the crimes were
committed during a struggle for power they were
political in character. 119 Neither court analyzed,
nor did they seem to consider, the requirement that
a nexus be shown between the mass killings and
the political struggle. This conclusion, although
not the ultimate holding in the Artukovic case, is
unsettling because it places greater emphasis on
the timing of the defendant's acts than on whether
he in any sense furthered a political revolt. Both
the circuit and district courts refused to interpret
war crimes against civilians as being beyond the
purview of the Castolini test. 120
Since Artukovic, the courts have applied the Cas-
tolini test with a relatively consistent regard for
whether the accused committed the offense in fur-
therance of political revolt. In Ramos v. Diaz,12 1 for
example, the Cuban government requested extra-
dition of two former soldiers who had escaped from
prison following Castro's rise to power. A Cuban
court had convicted the men for killing an escaping
prisoner shortly following Batista's downfall. The
United States district court concluded that the
victim had been a political prisoner captured in
furtherance of the uprising and that the offense
therefore was political in character. The court
looked beyond the existence of the Castro uprising
to consider the identity and political position of
the victim as well as the manner in which the acts
"1 140 F. Supp. at 246-47; 247 F.2d at 204.
16 Id.
17 355 U.S. 393 (1958) (hearing to be conducted pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184).
118 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
"
9 Id. at 393.
"20 140 F. Supp. at 247; 247 F.2d at 204-05; 170 F.
Supp. at 392-94. See also M. BASSIOUN, EXTRADITION,
supra note 21, at 420-26.
121 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
of the accused played a part in the revolution.1
2
Similarly, in In re Gonzalez'23 the district court held
that, in the absence of an uprising, the murder of
two prisoners by a guard in the Dominican Repub-
lic could not have been in furtherance of a political
goal."
Other than in scattered dicta, the American
courts have refused to inquire into the motive
behind the requesting country's requisition. 2 5 For
example, inJimenez v. Aristeguieta126 the Venezuelan
government sought the extradition of the recently
deposed President Jimenez on charges of murder,
embezzlement, and fraud, all extraditable offenses
under the treaty between the United States and
Venezula. After a finding of probable cause on the
embezzlement and fraud charges,1 27 the court cer-
tified Jimenez to the Secretary of State who ordered
his extradition to Venezuela.' 28 The case is signifi-
cant because it indicates the strictness of the Amer-
ican judiciary's interpretation of the political of-
fense exception. Even where a former head of state
was sought by those who forcibly overthrew him,
the court declined to examine the motives behind
the request.
129
22 Id. at 462-63. Although the court cited Artukovic as
authority, it is clear from the opinion that the analysis in
Diaz went well beyond a determination of contempo-
raneity.
z3 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
24Id. at 721. The district judge did suggest in dicta
that under some circumstances it might be appropriate
to relax the political disturbance requirement, particu-
larly where the requesting government is a totalitarian
state. The court concluded, however, that Gonzales had
been in no sense politically motivated and was therefore
definitely liable to extradition under any approach. Id. at
721 n.9.
"25See In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. at 721.
12r 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'dper curiam sub nom.
Jiminez v. Hixon, 314 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 914 (1963).
127 Similarly, it appears that the American judiciary
has not considered financial crimes whether committed
by governmental officials or businessmen as falling within
the political crimes exception. See Jhirad v. Ferrandina,
536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976);
Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189; In re
Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Fla. 1979); In re Sindona,
450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gallina v. Fraser, 177
F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 77, cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
128 Prior to extradition, the Secretary of State received
the assurances of the Venezuelan government that Ji-
menez would be tried only for those offenses for which he
was extradited. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547.
129 See I.A. SHEARER, supra note 12, wherein the author,
after reviewing the American approach, severely criticizes
it as narrow and outdated.
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What emerges from the American decisions is a
considerably greater adherence to the political dis-
turbance requirement than that of Great Britain.
1 30
The potential harshness of this requirement upon
individuals undertaking individual actions of con-
science is somewhat mitigated, however, by the
fact that purely political offenses, such as sedition,
are never extradictable. 131 Furthermore, the rule of
dual criminality 32 will prevent the extradition of
persons sought for nonviolent speech or assembly
offenses since those acts are not crimes in the
United States. Thus, political dissent which does
not include the commission of a common crime is
protected under the treaty exception whether or
not undertaken in aid of a general uprising. Finally,
it always remains the prerogative of the executive
branch to refuse extradition on political grounds.
1 33
The American approach, however, provides a
workable standard only when the courts avoid the
pitfall of mechanistic application. Contemporane-
ity with a political disturbance must be viewed as
a prerequisite to the defense, not as its embodiment.
In order to distinguish actual revolution from ran-
dom terror the judiciary must undertake the diffi-
cult and delicate task of deciding what acts are or
are not attempted in furtherance of a political
uprising. Unfortunately, the courts have not to
date developed a uniform procedural approach to
this determination.
RAISING THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION IN
AMERICAN COURTS
American law has not developed a uniform pro-
cedure for raising or sustaining the political offense
exception. In many ways the exception resembles
both a jurisdictional issue and an affirmative de-
fense. Because a political connection makes an
offense nonextraditable, it may be seen as depriv-
ing the court ofjurisdiction.' 34 On the other hand,
a court might treat the political nature of the
offense as a collateral fact which defeats or negates
the claim for extradition and which thus amounts
to an affirmative defense. The principal distinction
between these two approaches is in their relative
'30 Cf In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. at 721 (murder in
absence of uprising not political). See also Cantrell, supra
note 9, wherein the author urges American courts to
extend the Gonzalez interpretation to make the American
approach to extradition consistent with England.
'3' See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
'
3 2 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
'33 See text accompanying notes 57-63 supra.
134 M. BAssIoUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 21, at 515.
placement of the burden of production and the
ultimate burden of proof.
The jurisdictional approach implies that the re-
quisition for extradition must allege the nonpoliti-
cal nature of the crime as an element of the court's
jurisdiction. Since the requesting country must
allege that the treaty of extradition is operative
and applicable to the particular case, 135 the request
should then also contain sufficient facts to dem-
onstrate that the underlying offense is not political
in nature. The burden of pleading such facts is on
the requesting country, and a request which failed
to meet this burden could be challenged in a
pretrial motion akin to a motion to dismiss.
This approach, adopted by both the district
1 36
and circuit courts 3 7 in the Artukovic case, was ulti-
mately rejected by the Supreme Court. 3 8 Artu-
kovic, it will be recalled, was charged by the Yu-
goslavian government with the murder of thou-
sands of concentration camp inmates. 39 The de-
fendant contended that the crimes charged were
political offenses and prior to any evidentiary hear-
ing he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
40
The district court granted the writ on the ground
that the political nature of the crimes was apparent
on the face of the indictment.1 4' The circuit court
affirmed, recognizing that the case was one which
dealt with relative political offenses. 42 Both lower
courts determined that the crimes were political
primarily because the indictment referred to the
German occupation of Yugoslavia and to the de-
fendant's position in the Croatian government.
Thus, the burden was placed on the requesting
country to include in its requisition sufficient in-
formation to remove the charged murders from the
political sphere, or at least to refrain from inserting
any information that even suggested a political
connection. Because the Yugoslavian indictment of
Artukovic did not meet this burden, the lower
courts dismissed the requisition prior to trial. The
Supreme Court, however, subsequently vacated
the writ and remanded the case for hearing.
43
Although the Court's one paragraph per curiam
15 See note 37 supra.
'36Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal.
1956).
137 Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1957).
128 Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958) (per
curiam).
139 Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. at 246.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 247.
142 Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d at 203-04.
143 355 U.S. 393.
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opinion did not set forth the basis for decision, the
reason was clearly the failure of the district court
to hold an evidentiary hearing.'"
Artukovic, though, actually charged with the
common crime of murder, claimed that the acts
were committed in a political context. 14 His de-
fense, therefore, was that the extradition request
was for a relative political offense.146 If the Ameri-
can test for a relative political offense was mere
contemporaneity with a political disturbance, then
the issue might reasonably be resolved on a motion
to dismiss or pretrial habeas corpus petition. The
actual test, however, is whether the acts were com-
mitted in furtherance of a political goal. 47 Deter-
mination of this issue requires consideration of the
motives of the defendant as well as both the context
and impact of the act. Since this information can-
not be gathered from an examination of the re-
quisition, the extraditing court must hear evidence
on the issue. This requirement accords with the
often stated principle that the political offense
exception is a mixed issue of law and fact, but
primarily one of fact. 46
An additional consideration against the jurisdic-
tional approach is the burden that it places on the
requesting country. In order to insulate its requis-
ition from a claim of a relative political offense, the
requesting country must allege sufficient informa-
tion to demonstrate that the crimes were not in
furtherance of a political objective. Not only would
this require the requesting country to "plead
proof," it would require proof of a negative. The
better approach, comporting with the purposes of
extradition treaties, requires only that the requisi-
tion set forth the ultimate facts in support of the
request and leaves the finer factual issues for reso-
lution at trial.
There are, however, two political defenses that
the accused might raise by motion prior to trial. A
requisition for extradition charging a purely polit-
ical offense rather than a common crime, obviates
the need for any factual determination because
purely political offenses are never extraditable.
49
144 This was the interpretation of the federal magistrate
who heard the case on remand. United States ex reL.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal.
1959).
145 Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245.
146 Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198.
14 7 See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
148 Ornelas V. Ruiz, 161 U.S. at 504; M. BAssIouNi,
ExraDrnON, supra, note 21 at 400.
149 See note 74 supra and accompanying text. The for-
mal charge will always appear on the face of the request.
See note 37 supra.
Similarly, a defense based upon the doctrine of
dual criminality, requiring only an examination of
the relevant foreign and American statutes,"
50
could also be raised on motion. A claim of relative
political offense however, is an issue of substance
which requires evidentiary support and must be
resolved at trial. Although it seems clear that the
defendant bears the initial burden of raising the
defense, 5 1 two procedural questions remain: (1)
what quantum of evidence, if any, is required to
raise the defense, and (2) who bears the ultimate
burden of proof?
The fact that no court has specifically or system-
atically addressed these questions' 52 might, in part,
be attributable to the very nature of the extradition
process that intertwines domestic law and foreign
affairs. The judiciary, consistent with a policy of
preserving flexibility in matters touching upon for-
eign policy, 153 has allowed each magistrate to de-
fine his own procedural approach.)" To shift the
burden to the requesting courts, some courts have
required expert testimony pursuant to statute1 to
explain the surrounding political situation,
1 6
whereas others appear only to have required an
assertion of the defense. 57 This case by case ap-
ISO See note 44 supra.
15 See In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717; Ramos v. Diaz,
179 F. Supp. 459. In Artukovic the district court on remand
referred to the political offense exception as an affirma-
tive defense. United States ex tel. Karadzole v. Artukovic,
170 F. Supp. at 392.
152 See 2 C. HYDE, supra note 65, at 1025; Proceedings
of The American Society of International Law, Third
Annual Meeting (April 23 & 24, 1909). The test as
applied by American courts is "when evidence offered
before the Court tends to show that the offenses charged
against the accused are of a political character, the
burden rests upon the demanding government to prove
to the contrary." Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. at 463
(quoting 2 C. HYDE, supra note 65, at 1025).
"' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corpora-
tion v. United States, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Cf Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (judiciary may interfere in
function of another branch of government).
154 See First National City Bank of New York v. Aris-
teguieta, 287 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated as moot,
375 U.S. 49 (1963).
l5 18 U.S.C. § 3191.
156 See In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Il. Dec. 18,
1979) (mem.).157 This appears to be the case from the court's lan-
guage in Ramos v. Diaz, 199 F. Supp. at 463.
It appears, after a careful review of the literature and
case law, that the first and only major dialogue on this
issue occurred before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law in 1909. Two experts on extradition matters
addressed this issue and came to two entirely opposite
conclusions based upon policy considerations. J. Reuben
Clark, Jr., a solicitor with the Department of State,
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proach might be adequate for an infrequently
raised defense. At a time, however, when the extra-
dition of Iranians, Palestinians, Irish, Haitians, and
others is a topic of almost daily political, legal, and
popular concern, it clearly is insufficient.
RAISING THE DEFENSE
Anglo-American law has long depended on the
allocation of burdens of production to achieve basic
policy goals.lss In criminal cases this allocation
reflects not only a concern for fairness to the de-
fendant, but also a social judgment that it ought
to be difficult for the state to deprive persons of
their liberty.15 9 Thus, the defendant is presumed
innocent until proven guilty, and the prosecution
must prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Even within this framework, however, defend-
ants may be required to meet certain burdens of
production when raising certain defenses. These
burdens vary according to policy considerations
relevant to the defense involved. Thus, a defendant
claiming that his confession was obtained in viola-
tion of his Miranda rights need only assert involun-
tariness in order to require the state to prove
compliance with the rule by a preponderance of
the evidence. 16 On the other hand, a defendant
seeking to suppress evidence of a suggestive pretrial
identification must himself establish suggestiveness
by a preponderance of the evidence.' 6 ' This dis-
parity in the defendant's burden reflects the pri-
argued that the accused bore the burden of raising and
proving the political offense defense by a preponderance
of the evidence. His opinion was based upon general
principles involved in the pleading ofjurisdictional issues
and the fact that the defense ran to the Court's jurisdic-
tion under habeas corpus. On the other hand, Julian W.
Mack, a practitioner from Chicago, argued that the
raising of the political offense exception went to the
merits of the extradition request and once raised by the
introduction of some evidence by the accused, the burden
shifted to the requesting country to show that the act was
a common crime by some unspecified standard of proof.
Thus, it was Mr. Mack's position, at that time, that the
underlying policy of the political offense exception,
namely the promotion of political change, required that
special protection be afforded to anyone claiming to fall
under the exception, as long as some political rationale
could be applied under domestic law. Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law, supra note 152,
at 95-124 & 144-65 (addresses of J. Reuben Clark, Jr.,
and Julian W. Mack).
158McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE 786-88 (2d ed. 1972).
'59 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
'60 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).161 United States v. Crews, 48 U.S.L.W. 4325 (1980).
macy in our system of the privilege against self
incrimination, in contrast to the lesser importance
accorded to the less intrusive nature of a pretrial
identification. Similarly, in Leland v. Oregon'62 the
United States Supreme Court held that the states
are free to place the burden of establishing affirm-
ative defenses upon the defendant, and may even
require that defendants prove certain defenses be-
yond a reasonable doubt.ss
The burden of establishing the political offense
exception also may be seen as a question of policy
rather than one of constitutional rights or funda-
mental fairness.'6 It is necessary to balance the
competing considerations of international comity,
enforcement of treaty provisions, and protection of
political dissent, within a procedural framework
that allows the defendant a fair opportunity to
raise the defense without unduly burdening the
requesting state.
In Ramos v. Diaztes the district judge addressed
the question of relative burdens and concluded
that "when evidence offered before the Court tends
to show that the offenses charged against the ac-
cused are of a political character, the burden rests
upon the demanding government to prove to the
contrary."'6 This interpretation is most advanta-
geous to the defense because the "tending to show"
standard can easily be met in virtually every case
where the defendant claims the benefit of the treaty
exception. The burden then would shift to the
requesting country to disprove the political con-
nection, presumably by at least a preponderance
of the evidence.167 The difficulty with this standard
is that its operation requires the requesting country
to negate all possible political connections without
first requiring the defendant to establish the pa-
rameters of his claim.
The presiding magistrate in Abu Eain recognized
this problem. Abu Eain argued that in order to
shift the burden of proof to the requesting state, he
need only produce some evidence which tended to
'2 Patterson v. N.Y., 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
:63 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
'6 Patterson v. N.Y., 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
'6 179 F. Supp. 459.
'6 Id. at 463.
167 See Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. at 463. The
requesting country in an extradition hearing only bears
the burden of showing probable cause because the ulti-
mate issue of guilt or innocence is not under consideration
by the extraditing court. See note 39 supra and accompa-
nying text. The court, however, does resolve the merits of
the political offense exception defense. In order for the
court to reach a decision one party or the other must
establish its case by the greater weight of the evidence.
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show the political nature of the crime.'68 The mag-
istrate, however, rejected this contention, and ruled
that the defendant was required to show the link
between the alleged crimes and their political ob-
jective.s69 This requirement recognizes that while
mere contemporaneity might tend to show a polit-
ical connection, more evidence is necessary to meet
the test of the substantive law. In essence, the
magistrate in the Abu Eain case ruled that in order
to raise the political offense exception the defend-
ant must present evidence of each of the substan-
tive elements of the defense.
170
The better approach is to require the defendant
to present a prima facie case that the offense is a
political one. The defendant would have to present
evidence, either through cross-examination or pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 3191, which standing alone
would be sufficient to show: (1) the existence of a
political disturbance; (2) the political motivation
or goal of the defendant; and (3) that the acts
charged were undertaken in furtherance of the
political goal. This evidentiary requirement in-
creases the burden on the defendant, but only with
regard to specificity. He may not simply claim the
defense, but must establish its elements. He still
might do this solely upon his own testimony, or he
might rely upon expert witnesses, judicial notice,
or even cross-examination. In.any event, the re-
questing state would be given notice of the nature
of the claimed political connection. The prosecu-
tion could then adduce its own evidence as to the
nature and impact of the charged crimes,'17' but
168In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 at 19. In his habeas
corpus brief to the Seventh Circuit Abu Eain argued that
he had met the "tending to show" standard by presenting
evidence of the general tactics of the Palestine Liberation
Organization. He had offered evidence at trial that
bombings directed at Israeli civilians were "typical and
common" undertakings of the P.L.O., but he did not
testify himself and he did not offer any evidence concern-
ing the motivations behind the specific bombing with
which he was charged. Brief for Petitioner at 25-29, No.
80-1487. On this basis he argued that the requesting state
was required to disprove that the charged murders were
political crimes. Id at 29.
' Id. at 20.
'
70 Id at 19-21.
171 The requesting state may meet its burden of pro-
duction by relying on legal presumptions, rather than by
actually introducing evidence. Such presumptions in-
clude (1) the rule of speciality, (2) the presumption of
good faith on the part of the demanding government,
and (3) the presumption that crimes directed against
civilians are not "political." Regarding the presumption
of good faith, see In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717; Gallina
v. Frazer, 278 F.2d 77. For cases concerning the nonpo-
litical nature of crimes against civilians, see Ornelas v.
would not face the obligation of contradicting all
possible political connections.
Assuming that both parties meet their burden of
production, one final question remains: which
party bears the ultimate burden of proof? On this
issue the courts of extradition have been neither
consistent nor clear. Some courts have held that
the defendant must bear the burden, 172 others have
placed it on the requesting government, 7" and still
others appear to have voiced both positions in the
same opinion.7 4
The nature of the decision to be made, however,
indicates that the burden of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence should be placed on the
defendant. 75 As noted above, the absence of a
political connection need not be pled in the extra-
dition requisition; it is rather the proof of a political
act which defeats the request.' 76 The defense does
not negate any of the facts of the charge, but
constitutes instead an entirely separate issue depen-
dent upon facts which are beyond the elements of
the crime. 17 7 Since the issue is wholly collateral, the
burden of proof must remain upon the party who
asserts the claim.
78
This conclusion will accomplish the basic policy
of international cooperation in extradition without
seriously compromising political dissent. The
placement of the burden of proof will not affect
persons charged with either purely political of-
fenses or with offenses involving speech and assem-
bly. Those who have been charged with common
crimes will be required to establish a political
nexus, but proof of such a connection is uniquely
under the control of the defendant. In any event,
once it is accepted that the defendant bears the
responsibility of establishing a prima facie case for
the exception, and that preponderance of the evi-
Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502; In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415. See
also In re Wisconsin and Armstrong, 28 D.L.R.3d 513
(Country Ct. of York, Ontario, Canada, 1972), affid, 32
D.L.R.3d 265 (Fed. Ct. App. 1973); In re Kaphengst,
(Fed. Ct. Switz. 1930) 7 Ann. Dig. 292 (Case No. 188) in
6 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 49, at 840.
172In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Il. Dec. 18,
1979) (mem.).
173 Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. at 463.
174In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG, mem. at 2, 6
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
'75 Id. at 6.
176 See Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393.
'7 Patterson v. N.Y., 432 U.S. at 206-07.
'
78 Id. The British courts require that the defendant
prove the political character of the crime. See, e.g.,




dence is the standard of proof, the questiori of
ultimate burden recedes in importance. This is
because in virtually every case the greater weight
of the evidence will either establish or not establish
that the offense was committed in furtherance of a
political objective. The court then may make its
decision based upon what actually was proven,
rather than upon which party had the obligation
of proving it.
The question of burden of proof will remain
important only in those cases where the evidence
approximates equipoise. In those cases it is appro-
priate that the balance tip in favor of the requesting
state. Our courts generally presume the good faith
of those governments with whom we have entered
into extradition treaties, 7 9 and there is scant reason
to abandon this principle in favor of individuals
who have not established that their actions were in
furtherance of political ends. This burden will
disadvantage only those who have been charged
with common crimes and who have not satisfacto-
rily shown a political nexus. Even in these cases the
defendant will continue to have recourse to the
Secretary of State. Therefore, it is reasonable to
place the ultimate burden of proof on the party
claiming the benefit of the political offense excep-
tion.' 80
17 n re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717; M. BASSIOUNI,
EXTRADITION, supra note 21, at 466.
'80 See Patterson v. N.Y., 432 U.S. at 207-09; Coriolan
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 559 F.2d 993, 997
(5th Cir. 1977).
CONCLUSION
The role of the American judiciary in the extra-
dition process is mainly preliminary. The courts do
not pass upon guilt or innocence, nor do they
actually order extradition. Rather, it is the function
of the judicial officer to ensure that the defendant
is afforded basic due process before the Secretary
of State makes the ultimate decision on extradition.
Recognition of this limited judicial role no doubt
contributes to the limited judicial development of
procedural law in this area.
With regard to the political offense exception,
however, the courts may actually make the final
determination. Ajudge's decision that a crime falls
within the exception may not be reviewed. The
importance of this decision to both domestic law
and foreign affairs requires not only a strict inter-
pretation of the substantive law but also a coherent
procedural framework.1
8 1
Although the courts have substantially devel-
oped a workable interpretation of the political
offense exception, no consistent procedural ap-
proach has emerged. Congress could provide such
an interpretation by enacting new legislation which
both defines the meaning of political offense and
provides a detailed procedural guide for raising the
exception. This would undoubtedly promote both
American foreign policy and the international right
of political dissent.
181 The lack of review ofjudicial decisions applying the
political offense exemption also provides an argument in
favor of deferring consideration of the issue to the De-
partment of State. See note 61, supra.
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